Home prices have surged in major Chinese cities, leading to concerns of asset price bubbles and housing affordability. The policy of home purchase restrictions (HPR) has been one of China's harshest housing market interventions to squeeze out speculative demand and dampen the soaring home prices. Beijing was the first city to implement the HPR. Employing the regression discontinuity design technique, we find that Beijing's HPR policy triggered a 17-24% decrease in resale price, a drop in the price-to-rent ratio of about a quarter of its mean value, and a deep (1/2 to 3/4) reduction in the transaction volume of the for-sale market, with no significant change in the rent or the transaction volume of rental units. In submarkets where housing supply was less elastic, the effects of the HPR were larger in price and smaller in quantity, suggesting that wealthy buyers likely benefited more from the HPR. The scope of the analysis does not allow conclusions regarding the persistence or longevity of these effects.
INTRODUCTION
Growing at a nearly 10% average annual rate for three decades, China's economy overtook Japan in 2010 to become the second largest in the world, and is now rapidly approaching the U.S.
Urbanization has accompanied the rapid economic development of Chinathe proportion of population living in urban areas increased from less than 20% in 1980 to 52% in 2012, representing the urbanization of over 400 million people in barely more than one generation, the greatest such migration in history. Market-oriented reforms in the urban land and property markets since the 1990s have replaced the socialist welfare housing regime and established increasingly competitive housing markets in Chinese cities. Housing demand and supply have been growing rapidly, becoming a major source for China's economic growth. The average amount of floor space per capita among urban households has increased from 21.81 to 29.15 square meters or by 33.6% during the first decade of this century according to national census data. By late 2009, real estate investment accounted for about 20% of total investment and around 9% of GDP, with loans to property developers and mortgages together accounting for about 20% of total loans (Ahuja et al., 2010) .
Home prices have surged across Chinese cities, leading to concerns about an asset price bubble and housing affordability. As of the writing of this paper, home prices are at all-time highs, and have experienced real price appreciation on a par with or in excess of that realized in other markets (e.g., the U.S.) that are widely considered to have had housing bubbles (Wu et al., 2012) . Nonetheless, given China's rapid income growth and large-scale rural-to-urban migration, there are different opinions about the existence of a national housing price bubble. Higher home prices may still be broadly in line with the fundamental factors and could be supported by a solid demand for residential housing (World Bank, 2010) . However, many agree that housing price 4 appreciation in the most expensive metropolitan areas, mainly the big coastal cities, has gone beyond changes in fundamentals (e.g., Peng et al., 2008; Ahuja et al., 2010; Yu, 2010; Dreger and Zhang, 2013; Wang and Zhang, 2012) . In addition, given China's high income inequality, concerns about the possible overheating of the market and bubbles are aggravated by the concerns that lower and middle income households cannot afford to buy an apartment in or close to the center of large cities (World Bank, 2010) .
The Chinese government owns urban land and plays the dominant role in controlling and managing housing supply, demand, and finance. The urban property markets' important roles in economic growth and local fiscal revenue (especially from the land leasehold sales) have led Chinese policymakers to closely monitor and frequently intervene in the housing market to maintain its stable growth, especially in light of the subprime mortgage crisis in the U.S.
Authorities at the national and local levels have adjusted land supply, access to credit, and the permission to purchase properties alternately to cool and stimulate markets (Chen, 2012; Lu et al., 2012) . However, there have been very few studies of the effects of government interventions in China's property markets, especially in local markets.
This research aims to evaluate the effects of home purchase restrictions (HPR), an unprecedented anti-speculation policy in Beijing. Instead of relying on aggregate housing price or rent indices, we apply the regression discontinuity design (RDD) technique to a large transaction dataset of resale and rental housing units in Beijing. We find that resale home prices dropped by 17-24% immediately after the implementation of the HPR, while rent remained largely unaffected. As a result, the price-to-rent ratio shrank by about 23-29% of its pre-HPR mean value. It suggests that the HPR did lower Beijing's housing price, at least during the initial 5 years after the HPR. This paper also explores the intra-city spatial variations in the effects of the policy associated with submarket supply conditions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the HPR policy in Beijing in Section 2, followed by descriptions of data and methods in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 discusses results. Section 6 concludes the paper with policy implications.
HOME PURCHASE RESTRICTIONS IN BEIJING
Beijing, the capital city and a megacity of China, has one of the most heated housing markets in the world. According to the 2010 census, the urban population of Beijing reached 16.86 million, including about 64% locally registered residents (i.e., those with local household registration, or Hukou) 1 and 36% unregistered (or non-Hukou) residents. Between 2003-Q1 and 2010-Q1, Beijing's housing prices appreciated by nearly 20% per year in nominal terms (Wu et al., 2012) .
Recent housing price-to-income and price-to-rent ratios are at their highest levels in Beijing's history. By early 2010, estimated price-to-income ratios varied from just below 10 (Lu et al., 2012) to above 18 (Wu et al., 2012) . Wu et al.'s (2012) estimates also indicate an increase in the price-to-(annual) rent ratio from 26.4 in 2007-Q1 to 45.9 in 2010-Q1, suggesting the possibility of a local housing bubble.
As China's housing markets recovered quickly from the influence of the subprime mortgage crisis and housing prices kept on rising, the government introduced two rounds of market regulations in 2010 mainly to deter speculation. On February 21 st , the first round of 1 Hukou is a resident permit issued to households by the government of China. Every household has a Hukou that records information about the household members, including name, birth date, relationship with each other, marriage status (and with whom if married), address and employer. Rural Chinese who migrate to cities are often ineligible for basic urban welfare and social services due to the lack of a local urban Hukou. 6 regulation , hereinafter Policy I, required the down-payment ratio to be a minimum of 40% for the purchase of second homes (a reiteration of a 2007 policy 2 ) and raised the profit tax rate on home resale within five years of last purchase. Due to the limited effect of Policy I, in April 2010 the State Council required local governments to impose direct restrictions on home purchases, a measure considered by many as "the harshest housing market regulation". 3 The larger cities were urged by the State Council to implement stricter HPR measures and to do so more promptly.
Two weeks later, on April 30, 2010, Beijing became the first city to announce and enact immediately a bundle of policies, hereinafter Policy II. 4 The central feature of Policy II was the home purchase restrictions (HPR), the first command-and-control type regulation on housing demand. The HPR limits households with a Beijing local Hukou to a maximum of two homes (except that additional homes already owned were "grandfathered") while non-hukou households were simply prohibited from purchasing homes any more.
Accompanying the HPR in the bundle of Policy II there were two additional policies.
One is the further strengthening of Policy Irequiring a minimum of 50% down payment with a mortgage rate at least 1.10 times the base interest rate for the purchase of second homes. The other policy is essentially a reiteration of a national policy enacted in 2007 (see footnote 2) requiring the minimum down payment ratio to be 30% for a first-home larger than 90 m 2 in size.
Given that these two policies additional to the HPR in Policy II essentially only marginally 7 modified or reiterated previous policies and were less restrictive than the HPR's direct command and control, we will first focus our analysis on the HPR element of Policy II before returning to the two additional policies later in the paper.
To restrict the speculative housing demand in Beijing, the HPR does not deal with the factors motivating the speculative demand, and relies on a simple command-and-control of market entry based on Hukou status and the number of units owned. By restricting the eligibility to purchase homes to certain groups of people, the HPR significantly and suddenly alters the demand in Beijing's housing market, as detailed below.
The HPR brings two direct, first-order impacts on Beijing's housing market. The first impact is the dampening of demand for for-sale units as some households are denied access to the demand side of the market of for-sale housing, resulting in an exogenous negative demand shock in the for-sale market. This negative demand shock should lead to clear drops in both price and transaction volume in the for-sale market, although the impact may be somewhat mitigated after all sorts of secondary effects kick in. The other first-order impact is the forced shift of some households from buyers to renters. For households who have housing needs but no local Hukou, including many young graduates from colleges and universities, the HPR limits their options to either becoming renters or leaving Beijing, with the latter a more complicated and longer-term decision. However, whether and how such a shift of demand from the for-sale market (directly affected by the HPR) to the connected rental market will affect rents and rental volumes depend on a wide range of secondary market responses.
There are many possible secondary effects due to the behavioral changes of household groups indirectly affected by the HPR and the supply-side responses in both the for-sale and the rental markets. For example, the HPR still allows those households with local Hukou and fewer 8 than two homes to buy one home. They may be attracted by the housing price reduction (caused by the first-order demand drop) to buy, or alternatively, they may be discouraged from speculative purchase if the HPR reduces the expectation of price appreciation and thereby reduces expected investment returns. 5 On the supply side, while the HPR does nothing fundamentally to stimulate new physical supply of additional housing (the welfare-maximizing approach to putting downward pressure on home prices if there is not a bubble), such a policy could actually have a temporary positive effect on the supply of housing if speculative developers and investor/owners put their vacant properties into the market (including into the rental market) as a result of perceived effectiveness of the HPR at dampening price appreciation.
As a result, although rental price and rental transaction volume would face upward pressure due to the shift in demand from for-sale to rental housing, an increased supply in rental housing could offset any upward pressure on rent.
Overall, the implications of the direct demand-side effects are unambiguous for for-sale home prices and sales volumes (downward). But the effects of the HPR are ambiguous for rents and volume in the rental market due to the above-noted range of potential secondary effects. The previous qualitative analysis has important implications for the interpretation of a price drop in the for-sale housing market in Beijing immediately following the HPR policies. Such a drop would point to speculation as having played a major role in the increase in for-sale housing prices in Beijing prior to May 2010, as the speculative demand from owning multiple homes is the target of the HPR policy. However, any such interpretation would not be air-tight, as directlytargeted groups were only partially responsible for speculative demand. To the extent any post-HPR price drop resulted from the removal of the owner-occupancy demand (non-speculative 5 Other possibilities are plausible given the different expectation effects. For example, if households view the HPR as a temporary policy, there could emerge a new expectation-based purchase demand. 9 demand) by some households (e.g., the non-Hukou households owning no home), such a resulting price drop does not imply a speculation-based cause of the previous for-sale home price increases or the price level just prior to May 2010.
Finally, there is an interesting question of whether and how effects of the HPR may be spatially heterogeneous within metropolitan Beijing. An exogenous demand shock's effects on a market always depend on the supply-price elasticity of a local housing market. Several recent studies have empirically tested the effects of housing supply constraints (caused by different geographic conditions or local regulatory regimes) on housing price in different countries (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2005; Glaeser et al., 2008; Hilber and Mayer, 2001; Paciorek, 2013; Saiz, 2010; Stadelmann and Billon, 2012) . In Beijing, Zheng et al. (2014) find that the capitalization rate of public goods in home prices is larger in supply-constrained locations. We expect that the HPR affects Beijing's different housing submarkets differently. Specifically, submarkets with a smaller supply price-elasticity will show greater price drop and less volume drop following the HPR. This may have important policy implications about the distributional effects of the HPR.
For example, if housing price is correlated with supply conditions (e.g., housing tends to be more expensive where there is little room for additional supply), then this suggests that the buyers of expensive homes probably benefit more from the HPR because affordability is improved more where supply is less elastic.
DATA
We obtain resale and rental transaction datasets from a major broker company "WoAiWoJia" Figure 4) . It also has a more persistent growth trend during our study period, with significant seasonal variations.
Our resale and rental datasets overlap in 2800 residential complexes, a large majority of the complexes in both datasets. The units in a complex share the same architectural design, heating fee is about 10% to 15% of the gross rent. Also, in Beijing the condo fee does not include hazard insurance, which can be purchased by property owners from insurance companies. location and neighborhood attributes, and they are of the same age, while only differing somewhat in the physical attributes such as unit size, floor number, and level of decoration. We take advantage of this high within-complex homogeneity to calculate the complex-level price-torent ratio if a complex has both resale and rental transactions within the same week. We divide the average housing price per square meter by the average monthly rent per square meter of the transactions in that complex in each week to obtain this ratio. 9 Figure 5 shows the distribution of complex-level price-to-rent ratio and its temporal changes. Table 1 presents the definitions and summary statistics of the variables. Table 1 about here *** 9 Since the number of observations in a complex in a week is usually small, we are unable to run a hedonic regression to control for physical attributes. Therefore the ratio is calculated with simple averages at the complexlevel.
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METHOD
To identify a potential discontinuity in housing market indicators (price, rent, price-to-rent ratio, and transaction volumes) triggered by the HPR policy, we employ the regression discontinuity design (RDD) technique for resale and rental prices as specified below:
where Y i is unit home price or monthly rent of a transaction observation i,. HPR i equals one if transaction i happens after April 30th, 2010, otherwise zero. β 1 is the primary coefficient of interest that captures the discontinuity in the dependent variable due to the HPR policy. Vector β 2 captures any pre-existing time trend using a K th -order polynomial of sequential week numbers (Week = 1, 2, 3, …). Month li represents 11 month dummies to capture seasonality. The physical and location controls X m capture the cross-sectional differences in housing unit/residential complex characteristics. β 1 represents a constant effect of HPR during the subsequent history in our data, which is relatively short as it goes only through 2011, less than two years after the HPR's implementation. After estimating Equation (1), we can calculate the direction and relative magnitude of the effect of the HPR on the housing price or rent as
Similar RDD regressions are implemented with the price-to-rent ratio (aggregated each
week for complex i) and weekly resale and transaction volumes (i is suppressed in this case) as dependent variables, although only location characteristics are controlled for in the complexlevel price-to-rent ratio regressions and no physical or location control is used in the transaction volume regressions. 11 10 This is because 1
It is difficult to estimate the dynamic effects of the HPR (or any similar housing market intervention)whether and how the effects change over time (including how persistent they may bedue to both data and modeling reasons. To reliably estimate the HPR's effect on the housing market over time after the policy implementation requires additional information on the evolution of market fundamentals as well as on other relevant local and national policy interventions during the period of study, and it also requires a housing market model sensitive to all policy interventions involved (including perhaps inter-city market interactions). Such an analysis would be very complex and methodologically challenging, and is beyond the scope of the current paper. 12 For example, in the long term, deprived of the option to buy a home, some non-Hukou households at the margin may decide to move away from Beijing, which may restrict labor supply and hurt the long-term economic growth and housing demand in Beijing. There could be other side-effects or unanticipated consequences, such as the behavior of household formation, including possibly an increase in divorces (allowing the same two people to form two households, hence, buy two housing units), a reduction in marriage rate (for the same reason), and/or increased tendency for separate living between the generations.
affecting the broker's market share remained unchanged during the short period immediately before and after the implementation date of HPR policy. 12 Polynomial regressions, as adopted in this study, have the ability to approximate a difficult-to-evaluate nonlinear function, but very limited interpretability. 15
RESULTS
City-wide price, rent, and volume effects
We obtain strong and robust city-wide effects of the HPR on the price and volume in the resale but not the rental market. Table 2 Table 4 , we estimate rent change in time windows of one week, two weeks and one month on both sides of the HPR. However, we cannot identify a price discontinuity due to the HPR in the price trend of the rental market as the t-tests cannot reject the null that there was no difference in the way rents changed around the HPR. 14 *** Table 4 about here *** Table 5 presents the RDD regression results on transaction volumes with different orders of polynomial time trends. The transaction volume of resale units experienced a huge negative impact from the implementation of the HPR, with the sizes of magnitude ranging from about 50.9% (exp(-0.712)-1) to 76.7% (exp(-1.458)-1). On the contrary, the rental transaction volume did not show significant change around the HPR.
*** Table 5 about here *** Table 6 shows the results of the robustness tests using alternative symmetric time windows: 1.67 years before and after the HPRthe longest symmetric time window allowed by our data, and one year before and after the HPR, the minimum time window to control for seasonality. Overall, we get very consistent results about the direction and magnitude of the resale price effect no matter which time window or polynomial order we use (once that order is reasonably high).
*** Table 6 about For example, we cannot say definitively whether the HPR effect was growing or diminishing (or first growing and then diminishing) during the 20 months in our data after the HPR was 15 We used alternative time units to model HPR's dynamic effect, not the overall market trend, which has always been fitted by polynomials of weeks. The use of time units other than the week and specifications other than the polynomial alleviates the potential problem of multicollinearity between the market trend and HPR's dynamic effect.
implemented. 16 But the main HPR effects remain robust and consistent in magnitude once the polynomial order is reasonably high.
Potential effects of simultaneous policies
In Section 5.1 we assume that the HPR dominates the effect of Policy II. But, as noted earlier, that policy also includes some additional elements: a further increase in the required down payment ratio from 40% to 50% for second homes, and a reiteration of a 2007 policy requiring differentiated down payments for homes smaller and bigger than 90m 2 . 17 While it is difficult to quantify the precise independent effects of these two additional policy elements, we believe their effects were limited compared to that of the HPR, in view of the evidence presented below.
To estimate the effect of the increase in the second-home down payment ratio requirement (from 40% to 50%), we refer back to the earlier Policy I, implemented in February 2010. Recall that Policy I's main component is also an increase in the required down payment ratio (from 30% to 40%). With this in mind, we can examine some indirect evidence. Table 7 presents the RDD regression results for Policy I using an asymmetric time window of January 17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for detailed comments on this issue with helpful suggestions on empirical strategies. 20 literature, including Chen (2012, pp. 295-296) and in particular Lu et al.'s (2012, pp. 286-287) observation based on multiple waves of down payment ratio regulations from January 2005 to May 2010 in Beijing.
*** Table 7 about here *** Furthermore, we can directly detect the influence of a differentiated down-payment ratio by home size, given that this element of Policy II effectively shifted demand from larger to smaller homes, since the down-payment ratio requirement only applied to homes greater than 90m 2 . We estimate the HPR's effects in markets of different home sizes with specific attention paid to any difference around the demarcation point (90m 2 ). We spilt the overall sample into eight groups (<60m 2 , 60-70m 2 , 70-80m 2 , 80-90m 2 , 90-100m 2 , 100-110m 2 , 110-120m 2 , and >120m 2 ) and run subsample regressions. Table 8 shows the subsample RDD estimates of the effect of the HPR on resale prices with different polynomial time trends. Estimated HPR coefficients are all negative and statistically significant, suggesting a market-wide effect of the HPR on resale home price, including in particular on the smaller home sizes below the threshold of the down-payment policy impact. The estimated HPR effects in different home size categories ranges from a more dispersed -0.19 (a 17% reduction) to -0.38 (a 32% reduction) with 6 th order polynomial time trend, to a narrower -0.23 (a 20% reduction) to -0.35 (a 30% reduction) with 5 th order polynomial time trend, compared to the more focused range of 20-23% reduction estimated using the full sample in Table 3 . Interestingly, there is a clear trend that the HPR effects become more significant (negatively) as we move from the 80-90 m 2 category (estimated HPR effects of -0.22 to -0.27 or 20-24% reduction) to the 100-110 m 2 category (estimated HPR effects of -0.35 21 to -0.38 or 30-32% reduction), but beyond this size group the trend in the impact is reversed. This is shown graphically in Figure 8 . The significant jump in price discontinuity around the 90 m 2 threshold could well be due to the differentiated down payment policy. 18 While there is no reason to believe that independently the HPR would necessarily have an equal effect in the different home size categories, the effect of the differentiated down payment ratios does seem to be consistent with an independent effect of the HPR, given the results below the down-payment impact threshold at 90m 2 .The market-wide significant effect of Policy II, and in particular the impact on the smaller housing units below the 90m 2 down-payment policy threshold, suggests that it is reasonable to claim that the independent effect of the HPR by itself lies in the range of about -0.19 (a 17% reduction) to -0.27 (a 24% reduction), the corresponding lower and higher bounds of the estimates from subsamples below 90m 2 .
*** Table 8 about here *** *** Figure 8 about here ***
Spatial heterogeneous effects across submarkets
As a final focus of our study, our analysis confirms that Policy II's effects (presumably largely the HPR's effects, based on the above results) are heterogeneous across submarkets in Beijing with different supply elasticity. We follow Zheng et al. (2014) to combine three to six adjacent Jiedaos (Street Offices) with continuous concentrated economic activities into 25 zones as the basic geographic unit of submarket analysis. Instead of using a direct measure of housing supply elasticity, we use an exogenous variation in land availability across different locations in Beijing.
During the pre-reform socialist era, state-owned manufacturing enterprises were located across the central and periphery locations in cities (Zheng et al., 2006) . We divide the 25 zones into two subgroupsthose with lower land availability (lower SOE employment density in 2000) and those with higher land availability (i.e., higher SOE employment density in 2000). We estimate Equation (1) using the two subsamples and compare the subsample effects of the HPR. Table 9 presents the sub-sample RDD regression results. The HPR policy decreases the resale price by about 23.5% in the zones with relatively inelastic land supply, larger than its effect in the zones with relatively elastic land supply (21%). A similar contrast is found in the resale volume effects, with the reduction in resale volume reaching 59% in submarkets of more elastic supply, compared to the 46% reduction where supply is less elastic.
Two-sample t-test results suggest that the intra-city differences in both price and volume effects are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.
*** Table 9 about here ***
CONCLUSION
Home prices have surged in major Chinese cities, leading to concerns about asset price bubbles and home affordability. China has enacted numerous policies to intervene in its urban housing market, but there have been few studies evaluating their intended and unintended consequences.
The HPR has been one of China's harshest housing market interventions, aimed at squeezing out speculative demand and thereby dampening the rise in home prices. Our findings provide evidence of the HPR's early or initial effects. Using large datasets of resale and rental market transactions in Beijing and employing the regression discontinuity design technique, we find that
Beijing's HPR policy triggered a 17% to 24% decrease in resale price, a decrease in the price-torent ratio of 23-29% of its pre-HPR mean, and a very deep reduction in the transaction volume in the for-sale market, with no significant change in the rent or the rental transaction volume of rental units. In submarkets where housing supply was less elastic, the effects of the HPR were larger in price and smaller in quantity.
A few policy implications arise from our results. A direct interpretation of our results is that the HPR policy achieved the goal of lowering housing prices without hurting renters (usually 24 the less wealthy), at least during the 1.67 years of post-HPR time period we have examined. Of course, to improve housing affordability, simply reducing home prices in the short run may not help in the long run if it does not reduce the vacancy rate and if it suppresses new construction.
The ultimate evaluation of the HPR's welfare effect thus depends on whether it helps to get units occupied (the lack of significant effects in the rental market observed in this study does suggest the possibility of increased rental supply from previously unoccupied units) and whether it avoids suppressing new construction. On the other hand, our results that submarkets with smaller supply price-elasticity show greater price drop and less volume drop point to the spatially heterogeneous effect that may be of concern to policy makers. As in many cities, home price is likely correlated with supply conditions in Beijing (e.g., housing tends to be more expensive where supply is less elastic, such as in the densely developed areas). This means that the buyers of more expensive homes probably benefit more from the HPR because it triggered a bigger relative decline (and an even larger absolute decline) in market price in those submarkets.
It should be noted that the HPR's negative effects on the resale market and price-to-rent ratio identified in this study are only suggestive about the possibility of the existence and magnitude of speculative demand in Beijing's housing market. These results do not represent a "clean" piece of evidence of the existence of speculative demand, because the owner-occupancy demand of some non-Hukou households is also curtailed by the HPR policy. In addition, the HPR cannot prevent speculative purchases by some, especially the Hukou households with one home. The HPR effects quantified in this paper may be an underestimate of the magnitude of speculative demand in this regard. 21 Similarly, the lack of significant rental price and volume 21 Likewise, the lack of significant effect in the rental market also cannot suggest a definitive existence of unusually large number of vacant units (a sign of significant speculation) before the HPR, because some previous renters who are eligible to buy may move from the rental to the purchase market as a result of the HPR effect on housing prices.
25
impacts cannot be exclusively attributed to an increase in occupancy, a sign of the existence of a pre-HPR bubble. Overall, one could be more definitive about the existence of a housing bubble if crucial information such as the change in vacancy and new construction were available. In the long run, the best policy choice to avoid or curtail excessive speculative purchase of housing perhaps should be the provision of more alternatives for people to save and invest their money that offer the prospect of good returns and inflation protection (i.e., development of a more modern and complete capital market). The scope of the analysis does not allow conclusions regarding the persistence or longevity of these effects. Zheng, S., Fu, Y., & Liu, H. (2006) . Housing-choice hindrances and urban spatial structure: 
Figure 4 Monthly Rents of New Rental Contracts
Note: the green line is the fitted rent in the RDD regression with a tenth-order polynomial time trend.
Figure 5 Complex-Level Price-to-Rent Ratios
Note: the green line is the fitted price-to-rent ratio in the RDD regression with a tenth-order polynomial time trend. (2) ***: significant at the 0.1% level; **: significant at the 1% level;*: significant at the 5% level.
(3) Standard errors are clustered by residential complex. Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered by residential complex and reported in parentheses; adjusted R-squares are reported in square brackets.
(2) ***: significant at the 0.1% level; **: significant at the 1% level;*: significant at the 5% level.
(3) Control variables are the same as in Table 2 . (2) ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level;*: significant at the 10% level.
(3) Month-of-year dummies are controlled. Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered by residential complex and reported in parentheses; adjusted R-squares are reported in square brackets.
(3) Control variables are the same as in Tables 2 (for price/rent/ratio regressions) and 5 (for volume regressions). 
